In a bid to resolve the Karnataka caste conundrum, Chief Minister Siddaramaiah has mandated yet another survey of backward classes, the fifth since 1975. But if competing interest groups can strong-arm a state government into rejecting survey data, can the exercise result in an objective identification of socially and economically backward groups? The move brings into focus the increasing complexity of India’s quota system and the need for rationalisation based on accurate data.
In the case of Karnataka, the 2015 Kantharaj Commission conducted an exhaustive survey that covered almost the entire population of the state, but its report was kept in abeyance until 2024. The full data is not yet available, but the politically influential Lingayat and Vokkaliga communities have complained of massive undercounting of their respective populations. Media reports quoting the 1986 Venkataswamy and 1990 O Chinnappa Reddy commissions alleged a sharp decline in the share of the population of Lingayats in particular, from 17 per cent in 1986 to 11 per cent in 2015.
The state government has sought to avert a political firestorm by ordering a fresh survey. The opposition, which highlighted the lack of transparency vis-a-vis the findings of the Kantharaj Commission, has pointed out that a pan-India caste census is scheduled for the coming year, so there’s no justification for spending Rs 420 crore of the taxpayer’s money on a fresh survey. In fact, further complications could arise if the caste census data does not match that of the state backward class commission survey.
In Telangana, as in Karnataka, the state caste census evoked a storm of criticism and allegations of unscientific methodology, data manipulation and undercounting of backward classes and other communities. It also reignited the debate on whether non-Hindus should be included in the caste census, given that caste stratification is not recognised by other religions. Telangana has sought to justify a quota for Muslims on the grounds of ‘backwardness’ rather than religion. As this argument recognises the de facto existence of caste among Muslim communities—whereas social equality is a core tenet of Islam—it is for the courts to take a final call.
The takeaway is that the caste census data is bound to be controversial, as competing interest groups jostle with each other to claim a larger share of the population, and therefore of quotas. The state governments will have to summon the political will to resist such pressures and find the wiggle room to act on the data.
The basic objective of the caste census is to further social justice. This involves not just identifying communities which are under-represented in education, employment and political representation, but formulating policies based on hard data. For the most part, this translates into larger quotas for these communities in government-run institutions and representative bodies. But increasing the quota for one community would mean reducing it for another, which no state government is prepared to do.
For example, following the 2022 Bihar caste census, the state government expanded quotas for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, OBCs and EBCs to a total of 65 per cent by amending the existing reservation statutes. In June 2024, the Patna High Court set aside these amendments on constitutional grounds, and the Supreme Court refused to intervene. As a result, quotas remained capped at 50 per cent.
Time and again, the courts have made it clear that the 50 per cent cap on caste-based quotas cannot be breached. In 2022, the Chhattisgarh High Court set aside the state government's order increasing quotas to 58 per cent. Likewise, the Bombay HC struck down an order exceeding the 50 per cent cap in 2021 and is currently hearing petitions against a renewed effort to expand quotas. Earlier, the Rajasthan HC and the Orissa HC had also rejected quotas exceeding 50 per cent.
State governments should not look at the caste census merely as an argument to inflate the size of the reservation pie. This is valuable data, with multiple uses. For one thing, it can lead to a more just distribution of quotas within categories. States can now implement quotas within quotas even for Scheduled Castes. The Rohini Commission has pointed to the cornering of reservation benefits by certain dominant OBC groups to the detriment of others. A third of the OBCs were found to have received no benefits whatsoever. This points to the acute need for reservation reforms, based on accurate census data.
However, slicing quotas more finely is likely to lead to social unrest, and this has led to pressure on the judiciary to either lift the cap on quotas or to extend reservations to the private sector. The potential downside of both is evident and could exacerbate the flight of talent from India at a time when it is seeking to leverage that talent to meet its developmental goals.
Another possible application of caste census data on the economic, social and educational status of the most underprivileged groups is in terms of welfare measures. Based on actual numbers, targeting of subsidies, community development programmes and financial allocations can be improved manifold.
Vote bank politics can lead to haphazard tinkering with quotas and resulting chaos. States should await the caste census data and use it constructively to rationalise the quota system and target underprivileged communities more effectively.
Bhavdeep Kang is a senior journalist with 35 years of experience in working with major newspapers and magazines. She is now an independent writer and author.
