Donald Trump’s G7 Snub And India’s Strategic Crossroads

Earlier this week at the G7 summit in Canada, US President Donald Trump delivered what could be construed as a diplomatic snub to the USA’s most important Asian ally, India, by simply ignoring its right to have a place at the top tables of the world while espousing the entry of Russia and China into the “rich man’s club”.

Earlier, some five years ago, President Trump had floated an idea that briefly rattled the club of rich democracies: an expansion of the G7 to include countries like Russia, Australia, and South Korea.

India, the world’s fifth-largest economy and a key strategic partner of the United States, was mentioned only in passing—and then mostly forgotten—and now, in his latest missive, completely dropped from the ‘Big League’.

To make matters worse for India’s diplomats, Pakistan’s military strongman Syed Asim Munir, who recently made himself a field marshal, has been granted a ‘royal audience’ by none other than president Trump, arguably the most important leader on this planet.

Of course, it’s a different issue that the G7 itself is now in danger of really becoming the G6 after Trump cut short his visit to Canada and differences arose on issues ranging from Russia’s latest attack on Ukraine to how to deal with the USA’s aggressive trade policies, which spare neither foes nor friends.

The message, however subtle, is clear: when it comes to shaping the rules of the global order, India is still not quite “in”.

That omission, while overshadowed by Trump’s more controversial overtures to Moscow, underscores a deeper strategic dilemma facing New Delhi today. Caught between its historical posture of nonalignment and the gravitational pull of Western-led coalitions in a fractured global order, India must now make difficult choices about the company it keeps, the platforms it prioritises, and the alliances it cultivates.

For all its rhetoric around an “Indo-Pacific” strategy and the Quad, the Trump administration’s foreign policy has been nothing but transactional and inconsistent without a long-term vision. Trump’s “G7+” proposal was less about building a new concert of powers and more about legitimising Russia’s return to the Western fold without making any concessions, something other G7 members firmly opposed.

In the case of India’s exclusion, it wasn’t so much a deliberate policy decision as it was revealing of Washington’s scepticism about India’s position in the world order and its strategic clarity and of India’s own hesitation to fully embrace a Western alignment.

While New Delhi has grown closer to the US on defence, technology, and building a global supply chain, which could help contain China, it remains economically protectionist, diplomatically cautious, and institutionally embedded in groupings like BRICS—where Russia and China are dominant players and which in more ways than one challenges the dominance of the West and of the US.

For years, BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—has been dismissed in Western capitals as a loose, incoherent bloc created based on an acronym coined by a Western banker and held together more by grievance than by vision.

However, amid a fragmenting global order, the grouping is gaining relevance—not in spite of its contradictions but because of them. The US, through its actions, is alarming its own friends and allies while strengthening its arch-rival China.

The expansion of BRICS in 2023 to include energy producers like the UAE and Iran and populous economies like Egypt also signals a broader effort to build a counterweight to Western institutions. For India, BRICS serves as a platform to assert its Global South credentials, push for multi-polarity, and hedge against dependence on the West.

Yet, the utility of BRICS remains constrained by China’s growing dominance and unresolved tensions along the India-China border and even by China’s assertively aggressive actions in the South China Sea.

India’s challenge is to shape the grouping into a genuine forum for South-South cooperation without becoming subordinate to a Sino-Russian axis. And that would be a difficult task indeed, given the way China has managed to gain control over the levers of newly built institutions such as the BRICS bank.

Which is why it remains important for India to cooperate with other democratic powers and reap the benefits of becoming one of the world’s largest democracies and economic powerhouses.

India is already part of key Western-led platforms: the Quad, I2U2, and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. It has signed foundational defence agreements with the US, engages in intelligence sharing, and is deepening tech ties. However, to the dismay of its Western allies, it continues to resist formal alliance commitments.

The case for a deeper strategic convergence with the US—on semiconductors, critical minerals, and Indo-Pacific security—is strong. Yet, formal alignment risks alienating India’s traditional partners and undermining its claim to strategic autonomy.

Many believe India’s best strategy may be to continue doing what it has done, if not perfectly, then pragmatically: pursue multi-polarity, build issue-based coalitions, and avoid entangling commitments.

Rather than choosing between BRICS and the West, Mandarins and think tanks in New Delhi believe India can leverage both. BRICS and other groupings, including the more regional BIMSTEC, allow India to exercise leadership in the Global South. Its ties with the US and Quad countries enable access to capital, critical technologies, and a hedge against China.

However, running with the hares and hunting with the hounds has its own share of risks, and India may well be among those hunted by both sides if the race breaks down.

After all, what Trump was proposing at the G7 was a “Grand Bargain” to Russia and China: play ball with the US, and past misconduct will be forgiven, and the two outlier powers can join the ‘Rich Man’s’ club to rule the global order.

Does that mean India should adopt Turkey’s posture during the Second World War? Turkey was a neutral nation but strategically shifted its leanings from Axis to Allied as the war continued, thus positioning itself to gain the most at the end of the war without suffering the consequences of the six-year-long war, which devastated Europe, Japan and much of East Asia. Should the Indian Prime Minister take on the mantle of Turkey’s wartime president Ismet Inonu?

What India must avoid is drift—strategic ambiguity that leads to marginalisation. Trump’s G7 snub was a warning, not a verdict. In a world where global governance is being redefined, India still has a seat at multiple tables. Whether it can shape the conversation and be on the winning side of the table is up to New Delhi.

The writer is former head of PTI’s eastern region network.